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ABSTRACT
We employ a novel approach to identify overbidding in the field. We compare auction prices to fixed
prices for the same item on the same webpage. In detailed board-game data, 42 percent of auctions
exceed the simultaneous fixed price. The result replicates in a broad cross-section of auctions (48 percent).
A small fraction of overbidders, 17 percent, suffices to generate the overbidding. The observed behavior
is inconsistent with rational behavior, even allowing for uncertainty and switching costs, since also
the expected auction price exceeds the fixed price. Limited attention to outside options is most consistent
with our results.
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ulrike@econ.berkeley.eduConcerns about overbidding are as old as auctions. Already in ancient Rome, legal schol-
ars debated whether auctions were void if the winner was infected by “bidder’s heat” (calor
licitantis).1 Previous literature in economics has raised the possibility of overbidding in auc-
tions and auction-like settings as diverse as sports, real estate and mortgage securitization,
corporate ﬁnance, and privatization.2 However, it has been diﬃcult to prove that bidders pay
too much, relative to their willingness to pay outside the auction, given the value of the object.
We propose a novel research design to detect overbidding in the ﬁeld. We examine online
auctions in which the exact same item is continuously available for immediate purchase on
the same webpage. At any point during the auction, bidders can acquire the same object at
a ﬁxed price. To motivate the empirical test, we present a simple model with ﬁxed prices
as an alternative to standard second-price auctions. In the basic framework, rational bidders
never bid above the ﬁxed price. When we allow for uncertainty about the availability of the
ﬁxed price or for switching costs between auction and ﬁxed price, bidders may bid above the
ﬁxed price, but the expected auction price is still strictly smaller than the ﬁxed price. Two
leading behavioral explanations can explain that even the expected auction price exceeds the
ﬁxed price: limited attention regarding the ﬁxed price and utility from winning an auction
(bidding fever).
The theoretical analysis illustrates that comparing auction prices to ﬁxed prices provides a
test of overbidding independent of bidders’ valuations, especially if it is frequent enough to raise
even the average auction price above the ﬁxed price. We denote the overbidding phenomenon
as “bidder’s curse.” Unlike the winner’s curse, such overbidding aﬀects both private-value and
common-value settings. Moreover, even if only a few buyers overbid, they aﬀect prices and
allocations since auctions systematically pick those bidders as winners.
We test for the occurrence of overbidding using two novel data sets. Our ﬁrst data set
contains all eBay auctions of a popular board game, Cashﬂow 101, from February to September
2004. A key feature of the data is the continuous presence of a stable ﬁxed price for the same
game on the same eBay website throughout the entire duration of the auctions. Two retailers
continuously sold brand new games for $129.95 (later $139.95). The ﬁxed prices are shown
together with the auction listings in the results for any Cashﬂo w1 0 1s e a r c ho ne B a y ,a n d
users can purchase the game at the ﬁxed price at any point. Hence, the ﬁxed price provides
an upper limit to rational bids under the standard model. It is a conservative limit for two
reasons. First, the auction price exceeds the ﬁxed price only if at least two bidders overbid.
Since winners who bid above the ﬁxed price pay a price below the ﬁxed price if the second-
highest bid is below, we underestimate the frequency and the amount of overbidding. Second,
1The classical legal scholar Paulus argues that “a tax lease that has been inﬂated beyond the usual sum due
to bidding fever shall only be admitted if the winner of the auction is able to provide reliable bondsmen and
securities.” (Corpus Iuris Civilis, D. 39,4,9 pr.) See Malmendier (2002).
2See Blecherman and Camerer (1996) on free agents in baseball, Massey and Thaler (2006) on football drafts,
Bernardo and Cornell on collateral mortgage obligations. Details on all other examples are in Section IV.
1even if no bid exceeds the ﬁxed price, bidders may overbid relative to their private value.
We ﬁnd that 42 percent of auctions exceed the ﬁxed price. If we account for diﬀerences in
shipping costs, which are on average higher in the auctions, even 73 percent are overbid. The
overbidding is not explained by diﬀerences in item quality or seller reputation. We also show
that the overbids are unlikely to represent shill bids. The amount of overbidding is signiﬁcant:
27 percent of the auctions are overbid by more than $10, and 16 percent by more than $20.
We replicate the overbidding results in a second data set, which contains a broad cross-
section of 1,929 diﬀerent auctions, ranging from electronics to sports equipment. This broader
data set addresses the concern that overbidding may be limited to a speciﬁc item. Across three
downloads in February, April, and May 2007, overbidding occurs with frequencies between 44
and 52 percent. The average net overpayment is 9.98 percent of the ﬁxed price and signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero (s.e. 1.85). While the second data set does not provide for all the controls of
the Cashﬂow 101 sample, the pervasiveness of the ﬁnding suggests that the result generalizes.
Our empirical ﬁndings allow us to rule out the standard rational model as well as rational
explanations based on uncertainty and transaction costs of switching. Another type of transac-
tion costs is the cost of understanding ﬁxed prices, so-called buy-it-now prices. Inexperienced
eBay users might not take the simultaneous ﬁxed prices into account since they are still learn-
ing about auction and ﬁxed-price features. We ﬁnd, however, that bidders with high and low
experience overbid with identical frequencies.
Our second main result pertains to the debate about the relevance of biases in markets.
We show that a few overbidders suﬃce to aﬀect the majority of prices and allocations. While
42 percent of the Cashﬂow 101 auctions exceed the ﬁxed price, only 17 percent of bidders ever
overbid. The auction mechanism allows the seller to identify the “fools” among the bidders, who
then have an overproportional impact. We further illustrate the disproportionate inﬂuence of
few (at least two) overbidders in a simple calibration that allows for the simultaneous presence
of rational bidders and overbidders. For even slight increases in the fraction of overbidders
above 0.1-0.2, the fraction of overpaid auctions increases disproportionately.
Having ruled out standard explanations for the observed overbidding, we consider two
leading behavioral explanations. One is that bidders gain extra utility from winning an auction
relative to purchasing at a ﬁxed price. This explanation is hard to falsify; it can justify almost
any behavior with a “special utility” for such behavior. However, we can test one speciﬁc
form, the quasi-endowment eﬀect. Bidders might become more attached to auction items —
and hence willing to pay more — the longer they participate in the auction, in particular as
the lead bidder (Heyman, Orhun, Ariely, 2004; Wolf, Arkes, Muhanna, 2005). Even though it
is questionable whether the quasi-endowment eﬀect can explain bidding above the ﬁxed price
for identical items, we test for a positive relation between overbidding and time spent on the
auction, both overall and as lead bidder. We ﬁnd no evidence. We also provide a simple
calibration, which illustrates that utility from winning, more generally, cannot easily match
2the empirically observed distribution of bids.
A second explanation is limited attention towards the ﬁxed price. Limited attention implies
that an auction should be less likely to receive an overbid if the ﬁxed price is listed very closely
on the same screen and, hence, more likely to capture bidders’ attention. Using a conditional
logit framework, we ﬁnd that, indeed, smaller distance to ﬁxed-price listings predicts a signif-
icantly lower probability that an auction receives a bid. This relationship is strongest for bids
just above the ﬁxed price. It is also particularly strong for a bidder’s ﬁrst bid, consistent with
one form of inattention, namely limited memory: bidders may account for the lower-price out-
side option initially, but fail to do so when they rebid after seeing eBay’s outbid notice (‘You
have been outbid!’). In summary, the strongest direct evidence points to limited attention. At
the same time, we cannot rule out that other explanations for overbidding are also at work.
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the debate about
the role of biases in markets, “Behavioral Industrial Organization”: Are biases less relevant in
markets, e.g., due to experience, learning, and sorting (List, 2003)? Or does market interaction
with proﬁt-maximizing sellers exacerbate their relevance (cf., Ellison, 2006)?3 Our ﬁndings
illustrate that a few behavioral bidders can have a large impact on market outcomes. Relatedly,
Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) model ﬁrms’ choice of earnings disclosure when investors display
limited attention. Limited memory and consumers’ naivet´ e about their memory limitations
have been modelled in Mullainathan (2002), along with market implications such as excess
stock market volatility and over- and underreaction to earnings surprises. Simonsohn and
Ariely (2008) document that eBay bidders tend to herd on auctions with lower starting prices
and more bids, even though they are less likely to win and pay higher prices conditional on
winning. Sellers respond by setting low starting prices. Note that herding alone cannot explain
our results since bidders should still choose the ﬁxed price once the auction exceed the ﬁxed
price. Dodonova and Khoroshilov (2004) and Shunda (2009) suggest that sellers set high ‘buy-
it-now’ prices in (hybrid) auctions to move bidders’ reference points.4 While an interesting
example of market response to biases, reference dependence does not explain bidding above
ﬁxed prices. Moreover, ﬁxed prices in our data are stable and, hence, cannot explain variation
in overbidding.
This paper also relates to the growing literature on online auction markets, surveyed in
Bajari and Hortacsu (2004) and in Ockenfels, Reiley, and Sadrieh (2006). Roth and Ockenfels
(2002) interpret last-minute bidding as either a rational response to incremental bidding of
irrational bidders or rational equilibrium behavior when last-minute bids fail probabilistically.
Neither hypothesis, however, explains bids above the ﬁxed price. Most relatedly, Ariely and
Simonson (2003) document that 98.8 percent of eBay prices for CDs, books, and movies are
3Applications include DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006), Heidhues and Koszegi (2005), Oster and
Scott-Morton (2005), and Gabaix and Laibson (2006).
4See also Standiﬁrd, Roelofs, and Durham (2004).
3higher than the lowest online price found with a 10 minute search.5 However, the overpayment
may reﬂect lower transaction and information costs (search costs, creating new online logins,
providing credit card information, site awareness etc.) and higher trustworthiness of eBay
relative to other online sites. Our design addresses these explanations, given that all prices
are on the same website and the ﬁxed-price sellers have higher reputation and better shipping,
handling, and return policy. Our approach also disentangles overbidding from mere shipping-
cost neglect,6 a n dg u a r a n t e e s ,i nt h eﬁr s td a t as e t ,t h a tt h eﬁxed price is available for the
entire duration of the auction rather than only after the auction.
Large and persistent overbidding has also been documented in laboratory second-price
auctions (e.g., Kagel and Levin, 1993; Cooper and Fang, 2008). It is smaller and not persistent
in laboratory ascending auctions (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin, 1987). Kirchkamp, Poen, and
Reiss (2009) ﬁnd that outside options increase bidding in laboratory ﬁrst-price auctions but
have no impact on laboratory second-price auctions. The latter ﬁnding suggests that we can
use outside options as a benchmark in second-price auctions and make inferences for second-
price auctions without outside options. The cause of overbidding in the laboratory is likely
to be diﬀerent from the ﬁeld.7 In particular, limited attention should not play a role in the
laboratory, where subjects are directly confronted with their induced value.
There is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the winner’s curse, extensively dis-
cussed in Kagel and Levin (2002). The ﬁndings on winner’s curse in online auctions are mixed
(Bajari and Hortacsu, 2003; Jin and Kato, 2006). Compte (2004) argues that an alternative
explanation for the winner’s curse is that bidders make estimation errors and competition
induces the selection of overoptimistic bidders. Diﬀerently from the winner’s curse, the bid-
der’s curse is not restricted to common values. Belief-based explanations for “cursedness”
in common-value and private-value settings (Eyster and Rabin, 2005; Crawford and Iriberri,
2007) cannot explain the overbidding in our data since it is suboptimal not to switch to the
ﬁxed price once the auction price exceeds the ﬁxed price, independently of the belief system.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we present a simple model
of bidding in second-price auctions with simultaneous ﬁxed prices. Section II provides some
institutional background about eBay and describes the data. Section III presents the core
empirical results. Section IV discusses broader applications of the bidder’s curse and concludes.
5Halcoussis and Mathews (2007) study auction and ﬁxed prices for similar products (diﬀerent concert tickets).
6Shipping-cost neglect, as observed in our ﬁrst data set, was ﬁrst documented in Hossain and Morgan (2006).
7Experiments explore spite, joy of winning, fear of losing, bounded rationality (Cooper and Fang, forthcoming;
Morgan, Steiglitz, and Reis, 2003; Delgado, Schotter, Ozbay, and Phelps, 2008) and, for bids above the RNNE
in ﬁrst-price auctions, risk aversion (Cox, Smith, and Walker, 1988; Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey, 2002).
4IM o d e l
Overbidding is diﬃcult to identify empirically since it is hard to measure a bidder’s valuation.
Our empirical strategy overcomes this hurdle by using ﬁxed prices as a threshold for overbid-
ding. Auctions with simultaneous ﬁxed prices have not been analyzed much theoretically, but
are a common empirical phenomenon.8 In this Section, we extend a standard auction model to
the availability of ﬁxed prices. We show the assumptions under which the ﬁxed price provides
an upper bound to rational bids. While the theoretical analysis considers the case of homo-
geneous bidders, the calibration in Section III.C allows for the interaction of heterogeneous
bidders.
AB e n c h m a r k M o d e l
The bidding format on eBay is a modiﬁed second-price auction. The highest bidder at the
end of the auction wins and pays the second-highest bid plus an increment. Buyers can also
purchase at a ﬁxed price. For simplicity, we neglect the discrete increments, repeated bidding
within a time limit, reserve prices, and the progressive-bid framing of eBay auctions. While
these features help explain strategies such as sniping, they do not rationalize bids above the
ﬁxed price. Unless noted otherwise, proofs are in Appendix A.
Let the set of players be {1,2,...,N}, N ≥ 2, and their valuations v1,v 2,...,v N.T h e
vector v of valuations is drawn from a distribution with no atoms and full support on RN
+.
Valuations are private information. We extend the standard second-price auction to a two-
stage game. The ﬁrst stage is a second-price auction. Each bidder i bids an amount bi ∈ R+.
The highest bidder wins and pays a price pw equal to the second-highest bid. Ties are resolved
by awarding the item to each high bidder with equal probability. In the second stage, players
can purchase the good at a ﬁxed price p>0. There is unlimited supply of the good in the
second stage, but only one unit is valuable to a player. If indiﬀerent, players purchase the
good. Conditional on winning the auction, player i’s payoﬀ is vi −pw if she does not purchase
in the second stage and vi − pw − p if she purchases. Conditional on losing the auction, her
payoﬀ is 0 if she does not purchase in the second stage and vi − p if she purchases.
Proposition 1 (Benchmark Case). (a) The following strategy proﬁle is a Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE): In the ﬁrst stage (the second-price auction), each player i bids her valuation
up to the ﬁxed price: b∗
i =m i n {vi,p}. In the second stage (the ﬁxed-price transaction), player
i purchases if and only if she has lost the auction and her valuation is weakly higher than the
8For airline tickets see skyauction.com and priceline.com versus online sales, e.g., Orbitz; for time shares bid-
shares.com; for cars southsideautoauctions.com.au; for equipment and real estate the General Services Adminis-
tration, treasury.gov/auctions, usa.gov/shopping/shopping.shtml, and gsasuctions.gov; for online ads Google’s
AdSense versus advertising agencies’ ﬁxed prices; and for concert tickets ticket-auction.net or seatwave.com
versus promoters’ ﬁxed prices.
5posted price (vi ≥ p). (b) For all realizations of valuations v and in all PBEs, the auction price
is weakly smaller than the ﬁxed price: pw(v) ≤ p ∀v ∈ RN
+.
Proposition 1.(a) illustrates that, rather than simply bidding their valuations as in the classic
analysis of Vickrey (1961), bidders bid at most the ﬁxed price if there is a ﬁxed-price option.
If they do not win the auction they then purchase at the ﬁxed price if their value is high
enough. The strategy proﬁle described in Proposition 1.(a) is unique if we rule out degenerate
equilibria. An example of a degenerate PBE is that, for all realizations of v,o n ep e r s o n ,s a y
bidder 1, always bids an amount above p, b1 > p,i nt h eﬁrst stage and does not purchase in
the second stage; all others bid 0 in the ﬁrst stage and purchase in the second stage if and only
if their valuation is weakly higher than p. Proposition 1.(b) states that, even in degenerate
equilibria, the auction price never exceeds p.
One extension of the benchmark model is uncertainty about the future availability of the
ﬁxed price. In the eBay case, the initial search results screen shows both the ongoing auctions
and the ﬁxed prices for a given item. However, if a bidder bids in the auction but later wants
to return to the ﬁxed price, it might have disappeared. To incorporate such uncertainty, we
assume that, at the beginning of the game, the item is available both in the auction and at the
ﬁxed price p. Once the auction is over, however, the ﬁxed price p remains available only with
probability α ∈ [0,1). Formally, we add an “initial stage” to the game, called stage 0. (Stage 0
was redundant in the benchmark case because the utility of buying initially is identical to the
utility of buying after the auction.) All bidders can purchase the item at p in stage 0. In stage
1, players submit auction bids and, in stage 2, they decide again whether or not to purchase
at the ﬁxed price – if the item is still available. We capture the decision of a player i not to
enter the auction with bi =0 . 9 Proposition 1’ characterizes the equilibrium strategies in the
subgame after bidders have entered the auction and the resulting auction prices.
Proposition 1’ (Uncertainty). (a) The following strategy proﬁle is a PBE in the subgame
after entering the auction: each player i who enters the auction bids b∗
i =m i n {υi,(1 − α)υi +
αp} = υi − αmax{υi − p,0} and then purchases at the ﬁxed price, insofar still available, if
and only if she has lost the auction and her valuation is weakly higher than the ﬁxed price
(vi ≥ p). (b) In all PBEs of the (full) game with uncertainty, the expected winning price is
strictly smaller than the ﬁxed price: E[pw] < p.
Proposition 1’ illustrates that, under uncertainty, bidders do not necessarily bid less than
the ﬁxed price. Instead, bidders with a valuation above the ﬁxed price may bid up to a
convex combination of ﬁxed price and own valuation, where the weights are determined by
the probability of the ﬁxed price remaining available. However, the expected auction price
still does not exceed the ﬁxed price. As we show in the proof of part (b), players with a low
vi ∈ [0,p] do not purchase in the ﬁrst stage, but also do not submit bids such they would pay
9Note that, in any PBE, a player will never enter and bid 0, because not entering is weakly better.
6ap r i c eo fp or higher, and hence more than their valuation, conditional on winning. Players
with a valuation above the ﬁxed price, vi > p, are willing to forego the initial ﬁxed price and
enter the auction only if the expected price is strictly smaller than p, given that there is a
chance of losing the ﬁxed-price option after the auction. Note that our ﬁndings imply that
not all high-value players necessarily enter the auction, depending on the PBE. In any PBE,
however, the expected auction price has to be lower than p for all realizations of v and for all
players. Hence, the (unconditional) expected auction price is also strictly smaller.
Empirically, we will present a ﬁrst data set in which the ﬁxed price remains available with
certainty after the auction and where the persistent availability is easy to anticipate for any
bidder. We will also use a second, broader data set, where we cannot ensure the permanent
availability of the same ﬁxed price. There, we will rely on part (b) of Proposition 1’ to
diﬀerentiate rational bidding above the ﬁxed price due to uncertainty from overbidding.
B Transaction Costs of Switching
Another explanation for auction prices above the ﬁxed price is transaction costs of switching.
Bidders incur switching costs if it is costly for them to return to the webpage that lists all
auctions and ﬁxed prices after they have previously bid in an auction. Such switching costs
are not too plausible in the online setting. If they exist, players may bid above the ﬁxed price:
Once a player has decided to enter the auction she may bid up to her valuation.
We model switching costs using the three-stage structure of the game with uncertainty. In
stage 0, players can purchase at the ﬁxed price. In stage 1, they can bid for the good. In
stage 2, they can again purchase at the ﬁxed price, but incur a transaction cost c>0. The
sequential game structure is a simpliﬁed way to capture that bidders initially have the choice
between purchasing or bidding and incur transaction costs only if they return to the ﬁxed price
after the auction. As before, the vector of bidding strategies b include zero bids of those who
do not enter the auction. Bidders enter if indiﬀerent between the auction and the ﬁxed price.
Proposition 2 (Transaction Costs of Switching). In all PBEs of the game with switching
costs, the expected winning price is strictly smaller than the ﬁxed price: E[pw] < p.
Proposition 2 states that even though bids above the ﬁxed price may occur, the auction price
does not exceed the ﬁxed price in expectations. The intuition is similar to the uncertainty
case. In any PBE, players with low valuations vi ≤ p never purchase at the ﬁxed price, but
also do not submit bids such that they would pay a price of p or higher, and hence more than
their valuation, conditional on winning. Players with a high valuation vi > p forego the initial
ﬁxed price and enter the auction only if the expected auction price is smaller than the ﬁxed
price. The diﬀerence in prices has to be large enough to compensate for the times that they
lose the auction and either do not purchase in stage 2 because of the transaction cost or do
purchase and incur cost c. Since the expected price conditional on winning is lower than p for
7all realizations of v and all players, the expected auction price is also strictly smaller.
We obtain the same result if we add uncertainty to the setting with switching costs. Con-
sider the case that, once the auction is over, the item remains available at the ﬁxed price p
only with probability α ∈ [0,1) and, if available, only at an additional cost c.
Proposition 2’ (Transaction Costs of Switching and Uncertainty). In all PBEs of
t h eg a m ew i t hs w i t c h i n gc o s t sa n du n c e rtainty about the availability of the ﬁxed price after the
auction, the expected winning price is strictly smaller than the ﬁxed price: E[pw] < p.
Uncertainty aﬀects only players who would consider purchasing in stage 2, i.e., players with
valuations vi > p + c. With uncertainty, these players demand an even higher compensation
for foregoing the ﬁxed price in stage 0 and entering the auction, since they may not get the
item in stage 2. As a result, the expected auction price is even lower.
There are several interesting variations of the switching-cost model if we allow for irra-
tionality. One example is that bidders also systematically underestimate the expected winning
price. In this case, they enter the auction more frequently, and we observe more frequent bid-
ding above the ﬁxed price. Thus, biased expectations plus transaction costs could explain our
empirical ﬁndings. An extension is that some bidders are rational and anticipate the presence
of irrational bidders. Hence, they have further incentive not to enter the auction, increasing the
proportion of biased bidders. Either variation relies on irrational overbidding of some bidders,
which is the baseline fact we aim to distinguish from traditional models, including uncertainty
or switching costs. If we do ﬁnd empirical evidence of non-standard behavior, it is possible
that it is exacerbated by such traditional frictions.
C Limited Attention
One behavioral explanation is that inattentive bidders overlook the ﬁx e dp r i c e ,e v e nt h o u g hi t
is available on the same webpage. A simple way to model inattention in the two-stage game
structure of the benchmark case is neglect of the ﬁxed price in the second stage. Hence, they
only play the ﬁrst-stage game, which reduces the game to a standard Vickrey auction.
Proposition 3 (Limited Attention). If players neglect the second-stage ﬁxed price, each
player i bids her valuation, b∗
i = vi, in the unique PBE. Hence, the auction price exceeds the
ﬁx e dp r i c ei fa n do n l yi fvi > p for at least two players.
Proof. Since every player participates only in the ﬁrst-stage auction, the proof follows directly
from Vickrey (1961).
Closely related is the case of limited memory (forgetting). Bidders may notice the ﬁxed price
when they start bidding, but forget it over time. Our static model of limited attention can
be interpreted as a reduced-form model of the forgetting dynamics.10 Limited attention and
10Another possibility is that players learn the outside price only at a cost. If (some) players have high costs
8limited memory diﬀer from switching costs in that the expected price is not bounded above
by p. In addition, the limited-memory interpretation predicts that bidders are unlikely to
exceed the ﬁxed price in their ﬁrst bid but are likely to do so in later bids, when the memory
of the ﬁxed price fades away. We test this prediction in Section III.C. Finally, note that our
inattention model is a naive model: players are not aware of their limitations. In an alternative
model, rational bidders anticipate their inattention and adjust their strategies. The rational
model of uncertainty introduced above can be re-interpreted as bidders’ rational response to
anticipating the possibility of forgetting about the ﬁxed-price option when placing a bid.
D Utility of Winning
Another explanation for overbidding relative to the ﬁxed price is that bidders enjoy winning
the auction. Assume that bidder i earns additional utility πi ∈ R+ if she acquires the item in
the auction. All other assumptions are as in the benchmark case.
Proposition 4 (Utility of Winning). If players obtain utility from winning the object in
an auction, there exists a PBE in which each player i places a ﬁrst-stage bid b∗
i =m i n {vi +
πi,p+πi} and, in the second stage, purchases if and only if she has lost the auction and vi ≥ p.
Hence, auction prices exceed the ﬁxed price if min{vi +πi,p+πi} > p for at least two bidders.
Proof. The game diﬀers from the benchmark case (Section I.A) in the utility player i earns
if she wins: vi + πi − pw instead of vi − pw. Hence, the proof of Proposition 1.a applies after
substituting vi +πi − pw for vi − pw and min{vi + πi,p + πi} for min{vi,p} with the resulting
equilibrium bid b∗
i =m i n {vi + πi,p + πi}.
Proposition 4 shows that players with utility vi ≥ p − πi bid above p up to the extra amount
of utility they get from winning the auction. The equilibrium is essentially unique if the πi are
drawn from a continuous distribution with full support on RN
+ or, more generally, if there is
a positive probability of any player winning the auction. The proposition also implies that a
player may win the auction even though other bidders have a higher valuation but lower utility
of winning. The resulting allocation is eﬃcient only if we consider πi part of the surplus.
This set-up can be reinterpreted as bidding fever, including the opponent eﬀect described
by Heyman, Orhun, and Ariely (2004). During the heat of the auction, bidder i believes that
she gets an additional payoﬀ πi if she acquires the object in the auction. Once the auction
is over, the player realizes that πi = 0, i.e., that the utility from obtaining the same object
at a ﬁxed price is identical. From the perspective of the earlier or later selves, the additional
valuation πi is a mistake, similar to the valuation of addictive goods in Bernheim and Rangel
(2004). This reinterpretation aﬀects welfare and eﬃciency but not the optimal strategies.
Hence, Proposition 4 applies. Similar results hold if πi depends explicitly on the play of the
or rely on other players learning about the outside price, overbidding can occur in equilibrium.
9game, e.g. the auction price, the ascending-bid structure, or the time structure of the auction.
Another reinterpretation is quasi-endowment. Over the course of an auction, bidders be-
come attached to the item and are willing to bid above their (original) willingness to pay.
However, if auction and ﬁxed price are for identical, commodity-like items, quasi-endowment
should not induce bids above the ﬁxed price; the bidder simply purchases the item to which
she is attached at the ﬁxed price. Still, we will test for quasi-endowment in Section III.C.
II Data
The success of online auctions has been linked to their low transaction costs (Lucking-Reiley,
2000). Sellers use standardized online tools and do not have to advertise. Buyers beneﬁtf r o m
low-cost bidding, easy searching within and between websites, and automatic email updates.
Hence, online auctions should increase price sensitivity and reinforce the law of one price.
Our main source of data is eBay auctions and ﬁxed prices. EBay oﬀers modiﬁed sealed-bid,
second-price auctions. Bidders submit their ‘maximum willingness to pay,’ and an automated
proxy system increases their bids up to that amount as competing bids come in. The highest
bidder wins but only pays the second-highest price plus an increment ($1 for prices between
$25 and $99.99, $2.50 between $100 and $249.99). EBay also oﬀers ﬁxed price, so-called “Buy-
it-now” (BIN) listings. BIN sales make up about one third of eBay transactions, mostly from
small retailers.11 Rarer are hybrid “auctions with BIN,” where the BIN option disappears
if the ﬁrst bidder does not click on it but places a bid. The reliability of buyers and sellers
is measured with the Feedback Score, calculated as the number of members who left positive
feedback minus the number who left negative feedback for that buyer or seller, and the “Positive
Feedback Percentage” relative to total feedback.
A Detailed Data on Cashﬂow 101 Auctions
Our identiﬁcation strategy requires that homogeneous items are simultaneously auctioned and
sold at a ﬁxed price on the same webpage. Ideally, the ﬁxed price should be stable and
continuously present throughout the auction so that any bidder who searches for the item at
any time ﬁnds the same ﬁxed price. Moreover, there should be multiple staggered ﬁxed-price
listings so that it is easy to infer that the option will be continuously available.
T h em a r k e tf o rC a s h ﬂow 101 satisﬁes all criteria. Cashﬂow 101 is a board game invented by
Richard Kiyosaki “to help people better understand their ﬁnances.” The manufacturer sells the
game on his website www.richdad.com for $195 plus shipping cost of around $10.12 Cashﬂow
101 can be purchased at lower prices on eBay and from other online retailers. In early 2004,
11See The Independent, 07/08/2006, “eBay launches ‘virtual high street’ for small businesses” by Nic Fildes.
12The 2004 prices were $8.47/$11.64/$24.81 for UPS ground/2
ndday air/overnight.
10we found an online price of $123 plus $9.95 shipping cost. Later in the year (on 8/11/2004),
the lowest price we could identify was $127.77 plus shipping cost of $7.54.
Cashﬂow 101 is actively auctioned oﬀ on eBay. At the same time, two professional retailers
oﬀered the game on eBay at the same ﬁxed price of $129.95 until end of July 2004 and of
$139.95 from August on.13 They charged $10.95 and $9.95, respectively, for shipping. Figure I
displays an example of listings retrieved after typing “Cashﬂow” in the search window. (Typing
“Cashﬂow 101” would have given a reﬁned subset.) The listings are pre-sorted by remaining
listing time. On top are three smaller items, followed by a combined oﬀering of Cashﬂow 101
and 202. The ﬁfth and sixth lines are two data points in our sample: a ﬁxed-price listing of
Cashﬂow 101 at $129.95 by a professional retailers and an auction, currently at $140.00.
We collected all eBay listings of Cashﬂow 101 between 2/11/2004 and 9/6/2004. Data
are missing on the days from 7/16/2004 to 7/24/2004 since eBay changed the data format
requiring an adjustment of the downloading procedure. Our automatized process retrieved
bids and ﬁnal price from the ﬁnal page after an auction ﬁnished. Our initial search for all
listings in U.S. currency, excluding bundled oﬀers (e.g., with Cashﬂow 202 or additional books),
yielded a sample of 288 auctions and 401 ﬁxed price listings by the two professional sellers.
We eliminated 100 auctions that ended early (seller did no longer wish to sell the item) or in
which the item was not sold.14 Out of the 188 auction listings, 20 were combined with a BIN
option, which was exercised in 19 cases. The remaining case, which became a regular auction,
is included in the sample. We dropped the other 19 cases, instead of using their lower BIN
prices,15 in order to have a conservative and consistent benchmark with a forecastable price.
For the same reason we dropped two more auctions during which a professional listing was not
always available (between 23:15 p.m. PDT on 8/14/2004 to 8:48 p.m. on 8/20/2004). Our
ﬁnal auction sample consists of 167 listings with 2,353 bids by 807 diﬀerent bidders.
The summary statistics of the auction data are in Panel A of Table I. The average starting
price is $46.56. The average ﬁnal price, $131.95, foreshadows our ﬁrst result: a signiﬁcant
subset of auctions end above the simultaneous ﬁxed price. Note that the winning bid is
recorded as the ﬁnal price, i.e., the second-highest bid plus increment, instead of the true
(higher) bid. Shipping costs are reported for the 140 cases of ﬂat shipping costs, $12.51 on
average. They are undetermined in 27 cases where the bidder had to contact the seller about
the cost or the cost depended on the distance between buyer and seller location. The average
auction attracts 16.84 bids including rebids. The average Feedback Scores are considerably
higher for sellers (296.17) than for buyers (37.86). Sellers’ mean positive feedback percentage
13There were no other ﬁxed price sellers during the sample period, and ﬁxed-price sellers never used auctions.
14Dropping the (few) auctions in which the item was not sold might inﬂate the percentage of overbid auctions.
Unfortunately, the downloads did not store starting prices to check whether they were above the ﬁxed price.
Thus, all results are conditional on a sale taking place.
15Nine BIN prices were below $100. Eight more BIN prices were below the retailers’ BIN prices.
11is 59.81 percent. We also ﬁnd that 33.53 percent of auctions end during “prime time”, deﬁned
as 3-7 p.m. PDT (Jin and Kato, 2006; Melnik and Alm, 2002). Fixed-price items are always
brand new, but only 16.77 percent of the listing titles for auctions indicate new items, e.g., with
“new,” “sealed,” “never used,” or “NIB.” 27.54 percent of titles imply that standard bonus
tapes or videos are included. (The professional retailers always include both extras.) Finally,
about one third mention the manufacturer’s price of $195.
Panels B and C provide details about the 807 bidders and 2,353 bids. Due to the eBay-
induced downloading interruptions, we have the complete bidding history only for 138 auctions
out of 167. Bidders bid on average twice in an auction and three times among all Cashﬂow
101 auctions. About 6 percent of bids come during the last hour of a listing, 3 percent during
the last 5 minutes.16 The vast majority of bidders, with only two exceptions, do not acquire a
second game after having won an auction. We also collected the entire history of feedback for
each of the bidders in our sample and verify that they are regular eBay participants who bid
on or sell a range of objects, reducing concerns about shill bidding or mere scams.
B Cross-sectional Auction Data
We also downloaded 3,863 auctions of a broad range of items with simultaneous ﬁxed prices.
This data allows us to analyze whether the results in the ﬁrst data set generalize to diﬀerent
item types, price ranges, and buyer demographics (gender, age, and political aﬃliation). The
drawback is that the ﬁxed prices are not necessarily as stable as in our detailed ﬁrst data set.
The primary item selection criterion was comparability across auctions and ﬁxed prices.
Ensuring homogeneity is not trivial since items are identiﬁed verbally. Typical issues are
separating used from new items, accessories, bundles, and multiple quantities. We repeatedly
reﬁned the search strings using eBay’s advanced search options. Details are in Appendix B.
We undertook three downloads of all “ongoing” auctions at three points in time in 2007:
February 22 (3:33-3:43 a.m.), April 25 (4:50-4:51 a.m.), and May 23 (9:13-9:43 p.m.).17 The
product lists contained 49, 89, and 80 diﬀerent items with overlaps between the three sets,
amounting to 103 diﬀerent items. The items fall into twelve categories: consumer electronics,
computer hardware, ﬁnancial software, sports equipment, personal care, perfumes/colognes,
toys and games, books, cosmetics, home products, automotive products, and DVDs. The
distribution of items across categories and downloads is summarized in Table II. The full
list of all items and the complete search strings are in Online-Appendix Table 1. From the
resulting 3,863 auctions, we dropped those that did not reappear in our ﬁnal download of the
auction outcome page (e.g. since they were removed by eBay), that ended too shortly after the
snapshot to allow capturing the simultaneous ﬁxed price, that did not receive any bids, those
16Bidders can automatize last-minute bidding, using programs such as http://www.snip.pl.
17The resulting auctions ended between 5:42 am on 2/22 and 12:01 am on 3/1 (Download 1), between 2:22
am on 4/26 and 9:42 pm on 5/44 (Download 2), and 9:20 pm on 5/23 and 9:29 am on 6/2 (Download 3).
12in foreign currency, and those misidentiﬁed (wrong item). As summarized in Online-Appendix
T a b l e2 ,w ea r r i v e da taﬁnal list of 1,926 auctions. After extracting the auction ending times
from our snapshot of auctions, we scheduled 2,854 downloads of ﬁxed prices. The details
are in Appendix B. We matched each auction to the ﬁxed price of the same item that was
downloaded closest in time to the auction ending, typically within 30 minutes of the auction
ending. We undertook this matching twice, accounting and not accounting for shipping costs
being available.18 Ambiguous shipping ﬁelds such as “See Description” or “Not Speciﬁed”
prohibited some matches. Some auctions did not match because there were no BINs. The
resulting data consists of 688 (571) auction-BIN pairs without (with) shipping in Download 1,
551 (466) in Download 2, and 647 (526) in Download 3.
C Other Data Sources
Survey. We also conducted a six-minute survey about eBay bidding behavior and familiarity
with diﬀerent eBay features, administered by the Stanford Behavioral Laboratory in four waves
in 2005, on March 1, April 28 (in class), May 18/19, and July 13/14, with a total sample of
399. Subjects are largely Stanford undergraduate and MBA student and are not identical to
those in our main data sets. The full survey is available from the authors.
Choice Experiment. We conducted a choice experiment, also administered by the Behavioral
Laboratory, with 99 Stanford students on April 17, 2006. Subjects had to choose one of three
items from our Cashﬂow 101 data based on their description, two randomly drawn auction
descriptions and one of the two professional BIN descriptions. The choice was hypothetical,
and there was no payment conditional on the subjects’ choice. More details follow below. The
instruction and item descriptions are in the Online Appendix.
III Results
A Overbidding
In our detailed Cashﬂow 101 data, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant bidding above the ﬁxed price (Table III):
Finding 1 (Overbidding in Cashﬂow 101 Data). In 42 percent of all auctions, the
ﬁnal price is higher than the simultaneously available ﬁx e dp r i c ef o rt h es a m eg o o d .
Hence, the bidding strategy of a signiﬁcant number of auction winners is inconsistent with
the simple benchmark model in Section I.A. According to Proposition 1, rational bids never
exceed the ﬁxed price. As discussed, the estimated 42 percent is conservative since, ﬁrst, we
18The median time diﬀerences between auction endings and BIN download in Downloads 1, 2, and 3 were 21,
22, and 25 minutes for the matches without shipping costs and 21, 21, and 26 minutes with shipping costs.
13only observe overbidding if at least two bidders exceeded the ﬁxed price and, second, even
auction prices below the ﬁxed price may exceed the winner’s private value.
The construction of the data set rules out that buyers bid more than the ﬁxed price due
to uncertainty about the future availability of the ﬁxed price. The observed behavior may,
however, reﬂect other frictions not accounted for in the benchmark model.
1. Noise. Even if a signiﬁcant share of auctions exceeds the ﬁxed price, the diﬀerence in
price could be small, possibly just cents, for example due to bidding in round numbers. The
lower part of Table III shows, however, that more than a quarter of all auctions (and 64 percent
of overbid auctions) exceed the ﬁxed price by more than $10. In 16 percent of all auctions (39
percent of overbid auctions), the winner overpays by more than $20.
The six graphs of Figure II display the full distribution of Final Prices in bins of $5 width
(Panel A) and in bins of $1 width (Panel B). The histograms are overlaid with a kernel density
estimate, using the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 4.8. A signiﬁcant share of auction
prices is above the ﬁxed price both in the early sample period, when the ﬁxed price is $129.95,
and in the later sample period, when the ﬁxed price is $139.95. We also observe some evidence
of bunching just below the ﬁxed price.
The distribution of bids further addresses concerns about shill bidding for the seller. Even
if some overbids were shills, overbid auctions typically receive more than one overbid, leading
to the ﬁnal overbidding price. A shill bidder, who tries to artiﬁcially drive up the price, would
have little incentive to place multiple bids over the ﬁxed price and risk the loss of a sale.
2. Shipping Costs and Sales Taxes. Another hypothesis is that shipping costs are
higher for the ﬁxed-price items. We ﬁnd the opposite. In the subsample of 139 auctions for
which we can identify the shipping costs, the mean shipping cost is $12.51, compared to $9.95
for the ﬁxed-price items of one of the professional retailers. Accounting for shipping costs, 73
percent of the auctions end above the ﬁxed price plus the shipping cost diﬀerential. Table III
shows that the entire distribution is shifted upwards: Almost half of the auctions have closing
prices that exceed the ﬁxed price by $10 and 35 percent by more than $20.
Another explanation is that buyers from the same state as the professional sellers do not
buy from them to avoid sales taxes.19 The two ﬁxed-price retailers are, however, located in
diﬀerent states, Minnesota and West Virginia. Moreover, even if we add 6-6.5 percent sales
tax to the ﬁxed prices and no tax to the auction, overbidding remains substantial.
3. Retrieval of Fixed Prices. Another concern is that bidders do not retrieve the ﬁxed
prices. However, regardless of whether they search by typing a core word or by going to the
item category and then searching within this category, the output screen shows both ﬁxed
prices and auctions. If the search includes additional qualiﬁers, ﬁxed prices are more likely to
be retrieved than most auctions since their descriptions are more detailed and without typos.
19Buyers owe their state’s sales tax also when buying from another state, but they may not declare it.
14A related concern is that buyers may not take the ﬁxed prices into account due to past (bad)
experiences with such transactions. Our survey indicates the opposite. The 50.83 percent
of respondents who are eBay users were well aware of the meaning of “buy-it-now” and, if
anything, expressed a preference for buy-it-now transactions.
4. Seller reputation. Another explanation is lower seller reputation. The two ﬁxed-
price retailers have, however, Feedback Scores of 2849 (with a Positive Feedback Percentage
of 100 percent, i.e., zero negative feedback) and 3107 (with a 99.9 percent Positive Feedback
Percentage) as of October 1, 2004. In contrast, the average score of auction sellers is 262 (with
only 63 percent positive feedback).20 In addition, both retailers allow buyers to use PayPal,
which increases the security of the transaction, while several auction sellers do not.
5. Quality Diﬀerences. Finding 1 could be explained by higher item quality in auctions.
However, the quality of auction items is, if anything, lower. Some games are not new; others
are missing the bonus items. The two retailers, instead, oﬀer only new items with all original
bonus items and, occasionally, additional bonuses, such as free access to a ﬁnancial-services
website. The retailers also oﬀer the fastest delivery and a six month return policy.
A remaining concern is unobserved quality diﬀerences, such as wording diﬀerences. Our
choice experiment addresses this concern. Subjects were asked which of three items they
prefer, assuming that prices and listing details such as remaining time and number of bids
were identical. Two descriptions were randomly drawn from auctions in our sample and one
from the ﬁxed-price items. The same three listings were shown to all subjects but the order
was randomized. (See Online-Appendix Table 3.) Seller identiﬁcation and prices were removed
from the description, as was the indication of auction versus ﬁxed price. Three subjects did not
provide answers. Among the remaining subjects, 35 percent expressed indiﬀerence, 50 percent
chose the oﬀer of the professional retailer, and 15 percent preferred one of the two auction
items. Hence, it is unlikely that unobserved quality diﬀerence explain the bidding behavior.
Overbidding in the Cross-section. Our results so far indicate signiﬁcant overbidding for
a speciﬁci t e m ,C a s h ﬂow 101. It remains possible that overbidding is an isolated phenomenon
that does not apply to most items. To address this concern, we analyze a broad cross-section
of items oﬀered both in auctions and at ﬁxed prices. The results are in Table IV.
Finding 2 (Overbidding in Cross-Sectional Data). In the cross-section of auctions,
the ﬁnal price is higher than the corresponding ﬁxed price in 48 percent of the cases.
Overbidding is even more prevalent in the cross-sectional data, ranging from 44 percent
to 52 percent across the three downloads (Table IV). As Figure III, Panel A, illustrates, we
observe at least 30 percent overbidding in 10 out of 12 item categories. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant
relation between price level and overbidding. Expensive hardware (around $150) triggers little
20Feedback Scores have been used as proxies for reputation and been linked to higher prices in Dewan and
Hsu (2004), Houser and Wooders (2006), and Melnik and Alm (2002), among others.
15overbidding, while overbidding for expensive sports equipment (exercise machines around $200)
is frequent, 56 percent across the three downloads. Detailed scatterplots of the frequency of
overbidding for diﬀerent price levels in the Online-Appendix show that it is no less prevalent
for more expensive goods. Overbidding is slightly lower after accounting for shipping costs,
diﬀerently from what we found in the Cashﬂow 101 data. We also explore diﬀerences in
overbidding by bidder demographics, as far as we can infer from the auction object (gender,
age group, liberal versus conservative). A detailed analysis in the Online -Appendix ﬁnds that
overbidding is sizeable and signiﬁcant within each demographic subset. The results suggest
that the pattern of overbidding identiﬁed in our ﬁrst data set generalizes across auction items.
As discussed above, the larger-scale cross-sectional data comes at the cost of some loss of
control. In particular, we cannot be sure about the availability of the same ﬁxed prices in the
future or about diﬀerences in seller reputation between the auction and the ﬁxed-price listings.
Uncertainty and Transaction costs. As a ﬁnal step in establishing the overbidding
result, we consider rational explanations based on uncertainty about the future availability of
the ﬁxed price, transaction costs, and a combination of both. As modeled in Section I.A, a
ﬁxed price may not remain available after the corresponding auction. We have argued that
such uncertainty is not present in data set 1, but it is in data set 2. And, as modeled in I.B,
it might be costly for a bidder to return to the screen with the ﬁxed-price listings after having
bid in the auction. In either case, however, the expected auction price will be signiﬁcantly
lower than the ﬁxed price (Propositions 1’ and 2). We ﬁnd the opposite:
Finding 3 (Overpayment on Average). The average auction price is higher than the
simultaneous ﬁx e dp r i c e ,i nd a t as e t1b y$0.28 without shipping costs and by $2.69 with shipping
c o s t s ,a n di nd a t as e t2b y9.98 percent without and by 4.46 percent with shipping costs.
In the ﬁrst data, the diﬀerence without shipping costs, $0.28, is not signiﬁcant (s.e.= $1.30
and 95 percent conﬁdence interval of [−$2.27;$2.84]), but the diﬀerence with shipping costs,
$2.69, is signiﬁcant (s.e.= $1.27 and 95 percent conﬁdence interval of [$0.19;$5.20]), as shown
in Table III. This comparison is, however, a conservative test: the expected auction price should
be signiﬁcantly lower than the ﬁxed price in order to induce a bidder to enter the auction rather
than purchasing at the ﬁxed price. In the second, cross-sectional data, the computation of the
price diﬀerential is less straightforward because of the heterogeneity in prices across items.
We calculate the percentage of over- or underbidding for each item (ﬁn a lb i dm i n u sB I N ,a sa
percentage of BIN) and then average over all percent diﬀerences. Here, the net overpayment
of 9.98 percent is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 percent (s.e.= 1.85 percent), also if accounting
for shipping costs, 4.46 percent (s.e.= 1.99 percent). Overall, the prediction that on average
auction prices are lower than the ﬁxed prices is rejected in the data.
Finding 3 rejects all rational “frictions” modeled in the theory section, which require that
the average auction price is signiﬁcantly lower than the ﬁxed price.
16Another type of transaction costs is the cost of understanding the buy-it-now system. We
have already argued — and conﬁrmed in our survey — that complete unawareness is unlikely
since ﬁxed prices are very common, intuitively designed, and similar to any ﬁxed price on the
internet. Still, inexperienced eBay users may not yet take them suﬃciently into account. We
test whether overbidding is lower for high-experience users using the Cashﬂow 101 sample and
a median split by Feedback Scores (Panel B of Figure III).21
F i n d i n g4( E ﬀect of Experience). There is no diﬀerence in the prevalence of overbidding
among more experienced and among less experienced auction winners.
The percentages of overbidding are almost identical for low-experience and high-experience
users, 41.7a n d4 2 .2 percent. Also if we partition auction experience more ﬁnely, we ﬁnd no
relationship between overbidding and experience. For example, splitting the sample of auction
winners into those with Feedback Scores of 0 (17 percent of winners), 1 (19 percent), 2-4 (14
percent), 5-14 (20 percent), 15-92 (20 percent) and higher (remaining 10 percent of winners),
we ﬁnd propensities to overbid of 31 percent, 55 percent, 35 percent, 47 percent, 36 percent,
and 44 percent, indicating no systematic pattern.22
Finding 4 does not rule out that experience reduces overbidding; we do not have longitudinal
bid histories for each bidder. However, it does rule out that only eBay novices overbid. The
result also helps to further alleviate concerns about shill bids since fake IDs are unlikely to be
used for many transactions and, hence, have low feedback scores.
The results so far indicate that the standard rational framework does not explain the
observed behavior, even if we allow for a wide range of possible frictions. Our ﬁndings do not
rule out that these frictions exist. In fact, they may exacerbate overbidding if interacted with
consumer biases, as we emphasized in the Section I. Also, there are behavioral twists of the
above explanations, which can explain the overbidding phenomenon. For example, it might be
hard to form expectations about the future availability and prices of buy-it-now items.23 The
conclusion so far is that, without allowing for non-standard preferences or beliefs, we are not
able to explain the observed overbidding.
21Since the vast majority of ratings is positive (e.g., 99.4 percent in Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002), Feedback
Scores track the number of past transactions. The measure is imperfect since some users do not leave feedback,
since the measure does not capture bids, and since users may ‘manufacture reputation’ (Brown and Morgan,
2006). However, the measure is suﬃcient to reject the hypothesis that only unexperienced bidders overbid; users
with a high feedback score do necessarily have experience.
22Our results are consistent with Bajari and Hortacsu (2003) and Garratt, Walker, and Wooders (2007).
23Note, however, that information about current and past BIN prices is available via eBay Marketplace
Research, which informs subscribers about average selling prices, price ranges, average BIN prices, and average
shipping costs. Using this service, or researching past transactions themselves, bidders can easily ﬁnd out that
the ﬁxed price (or its upper bound) is constant over long periods.
17B Disproportionate Inﬂuence of Overbidders
Before we turn to the leading behavioral explanations for the observed overbidding, we show
that a high frequency of overbid auctions does not imply that the ‘typical’ buyer overpays.
Instead, it is generated by a relatively small fraction of overbids (Table V). We document this
phenomenon returning to our ﬁrst data set, in which we have detailed bidder- and bid-level
data for 138 auctions. (Summary statistics are in Panels B and C of Table I.)
Finding 5 (Disproportionate Inﬂuence of Overbidders). The share of bidders who
ever submit a bid above the ﬁxed price is 17 percent and the fraction of overbids among all bids
11 percent, signiﬁcantly less than the share of winners who pay more than the ﬁxed price.
The reason why 42 percent of overbid auctions involve only 17 percent of overbidders is that
there are many more bidders than auctions. The vast majority of bidders submit bids below the
ﬁxed price and drop out of the auction once the price crosses the ﬁxed-price threshold. Each
auction only needs two overbidders for the auction price to end above the ﬁxed price. Therefore,
the existence of a few overbidders suﬃces to generate a signiﬁcant amount of overbidding.
This ﬁnding reﬂects, of course, the nature of auctions. By deﬁnition, the highest bidder
wins and will thus have a ‘disproportionate inﬂuence’ on the price. However, the traditional
interpretation is that auctions identify the bidder with the highest valuation. The insight
from our data is, instead, that bidders may submit high bids for other, non-standard reasons.
Whatever the reason for their overbidding, the auction design implies that the bidders with
particularly high bids determine prices and allocations. The calibrations at the end of the next
subsection further illustrate this point.
C Explanations for Overbidding
Having established the extent of bidding above the ﬁxed price and addressed rational expla-
nations, we consider non-standard explanations.
Limited Attention and Limited Memory. One possible explanation is that bidders do
not pay attention to ﬁxed prices, even if listed on the same screen (Proposition 3). In that case,
we expect more overbidding when ﬁxed prices are less salient. The further apart ﬁxed prices
are listed from an auction, the more likely is an inattentive bidder to miss them. Salience also
varies with absolute screen position: The higher an auction is positioned, the more likely will it
capture the attention of a bidder, an eﬀect known as “above the fold” in internet marketing.24
To test these two implications, we reconstruct, for each bid observed in our data, the set of
all auctions and ﬁxed prices available at the time of the bid. That is, we augment the sample
of bids by all listings that were simultaneously available but did not receive a bid, separately
24The expression was coined in reference to the newspaper industry where text above the newspaper’s hori-
zontal fold is known to attract signiﬁcantly more attention from readers.
18f o re a c hb i d .W ed r o pt h eﬁrst seven days of our sample period and after the period of missing
data (7/16-7/24/2004) to ensure that we observe all simultaneous auctions. The resulting data
set captures 2,187 of the 2,353 bids of the full sample and, including the simultaneous listings,
consists of 14,043 observations. We assume that listings are ordered by remaining listing time,
as it is the eBay default, and that bidders only see Cashﬂow 101 listings. In reality, users may
reorder, e.g., by price, and irrelevant listings may show up, depending on the search. This
is likely to introduce noise but not bias. The two independent variables of interest are (1)
Distance to nearest BIN listing, coded as 0 if there are no rows between the auction and the
closest BIN (one row above or below), 1 if there is one row between them, etc.; and (2) Position
on screen, coded as 1 for auctions on top of the screen, 2 for auctions in the second row, etc.
We use a conditional logit framework, relating the probability of receiving an auction bid
to the closeness of the nearest ﬁxed price and to the absolute screen position of the auction.
We condition the estimation on one of the auctions receiving a bid at a given time.25 The
utility from bidding on auction i in bidding instance b is Uib = β1Dib + β2Pib + X0
ibB + εib,
where D is the distance to the nearest ﬁxed-price listing, P is the screen position, and X
are auction-speciﬁc controls.26 Assuming that, conditional on the choice of making a bid at
bidding instance b, εib is i.i.d. extreme value, the probability of bidding in auction i is
Pib =
exp(β1Dib + β2Pib + X0
ibB)
P
j exp(β1Djb + β2Pjb + X0
jbB)
.
The null hypothesis of rational bidding is that the distance to the ﬁxed price listing D and
the screen position P do not aﬀect the probability of receiving a bid, that is, β1 and β2 equal
zero. Limited attention predicts that the coeﬃcient estimate β1 is positive and β2 negative.
In Table VI, Column 1, we present the baseline results. Coeﬃcients are reported as odds
ratios. Standard errors are clustered by bid. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect of distance
on receiving a bid. The odds that an auction receives a bid are 1.176 times greater when there
is one more row between the between ﬁxed price and auction. We also ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly
negative eﬀect of screen position. An auction is less likely to receive a bid if its position on the
output screen is lower (odds 0.988 lower). The results are robust to controlling for the price
outstanding (and its square), starting price, seller feedback score, auction length, a prime-time
dummy (3-7 p.m. Paciﬁc Time), and remaining auction time; see Column 2. Also the inclusion
25We do not model the selection into the bidding process. One could embed the decision on which auction to
bid as the lower nest of a nested logit where the upper nest involves the decisions to participate in the auction.
Under the assumptions of McFadden (1978), the estimation of the lower nest is consistent for the selected
subsample of consumers, conditional on the decision in the upper nest.
26In a standard nested logit model, consumers make one choice from a standard set of alternatives. In our
setting, a bidder may make repeated choices. For the estimates to be consistent, we need to make the additional
assumption of no serial correlation of errors in the bottom nest. This assumption does not hold to the extent
that bidders tend to bid again on the same auctions.
19of more time controls (the square and cube of remaining auction time, dummies for the last
auction day and the six last hours of the auction) does not aﬀect the results.
In order to link inattention to over-bidding, we estimate the eﬀect of nearby ﬁxed prices
in the subgroup of auctions whose price outstanding exceeds the ﬁxed price. We introduce
dummies for auctions with prices outstanding ‘just below’ the concurrent ﬁxed price, auctions
with prices ‘just above,’ and auctions with ‘very high’ prices. ‘Very low’ is the left out category.
For prices just below or above we use either [−$5;$5] or [−$10,$10]. (Any range in between
and up to $30 leads to similar results.) We test for an interaction eﬀect with Distance to
nearest BIN and include the full set of controls. Columns 3 and 6 show that Distance to BIN
has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on auctions with prices below or far above, but a signiﬁcantly positive
eﬀect on the probability of receiving a bid for auctions with prices just above the ﬁxed price.
An increase in distance by one row increases the odds of receiving a bid by 1.4-2 (depending
on the interval for ‘just above’). Hence, closeness of ﬁxed prices directly aﬀects overbidding.
We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of nearby ﬁxed prices is particularly strong for bidders’ ﬁrst bids
in a given auction. After splitting the sample into ﬁrst bids and later bids, the interaction of
Distance to BIN and Price just above is signiﬁcant only in the subsample of ﬁrst bids (Columns
4-5 and 7-8).27 This ﬁnding is consistent with limited memory: Bidders account for the ﬁxed
price initially, but fail to do so when they increase their bids. Limited memory is plausible
because of the design of eBay’s outbid notices, in which eBay provides a direct link to increase
a bid, but no link to the page with all ongoing auctions and buy-it-now listings.
In summary, limited attention and limited memory emerge as plausible explanations for
the observed overbidding. Note that the results also suggest that bidders are naive about their
memory limitations. If they were aware of their memory constraint they could easily remedy it,
for example, by always submitting only one bid (up to the ﬁxed price) and never responding
to outbid notices. The bidding behavior described in the (rational) model of uncertainty
introduced in Section I.C can be re-interpreted as bidders’ rational response to forgetting the
ﬁxed-price option. Hence, Finding 3 about the average auction price exceeding the ﬁxed price
also rejects the rational model of limited attention or limited memory.
Utility from Winning, Bidding Fever, and Quasi-Endowment Eﬀect. Another
behavioral explanation is utility from winning an item in an auction relative to purchasing it at
a ﬁxed price.28 This type of explanation is hard to falsify empirically given that any behavior
can be interpreted as revelation of preferences for such behavior. We can address speciﬁc
forms, though, such as the quasi-endowment eﬀect. The quasi-endowment eﬀect postulates
27Column 5 also shows a negative interaction eﬀect of Position on screen in the subsample of later bids, but
not in the subsample of ﬁrst bids. This ﬁnding is not easily explained by limited attention.
28Our survey evidence suggests that bidding fever applies to some extent. For example, of the 216 subjects
w h oh a v ep r e v i o u s l ya c q u i r e da ni t e mo ne B a y ,4 2p e r c e n ts t a t et h a tt h e yh a v es o m e t i m e sp a i dm o r et h a nt h e y
were originally planning to, and about half of those subjects later regretted paying so much.
20that bidders become psychologically more endowed to auction items, and hence more likely to
submit high bids, the longer they participate in the auction, in particular as the lead bidder
(Heyman, Orhun, Ariely, 2004; Wolf, Arkes, Muhanna, 2005). One could argue that the
quasi-endowment eﬀect cannot explain bidding above the ﬁxed price, given that bidders can
always obtain the identical item at the ﬁxed price. Still, we test whether bidders become more
attached to auction items, and submit higher bids, the longer they participate, in particular
as the lead bidder.
A simple comparison of means reveals no relation between overbidding and the length of
bidding. Winners who overbid enter the auction 1.27 days before the auction ends; winners
who do not overbid enter the auction earlier, 1.52 days before the auction ends. The same
pattern emerges for time as lead bidder: Winners who overbid have been lead bidders for 0.55
days by the time of their last bid (1.03 days by the end of the auction); winners who do not
overbid have been lead bidders for 0.74 days (1.24 overall).
We then test in a regression framework whether the time a bidder has spent as the leader
aﬀects overbidding, conditional on having been outbid. The regression framework allows us to
control for the value of the bidder’s last lead bid and the time and price outstanding when she
is outbid for the ﬁnal time. Appendix-Table A.1 shows a probit estimation where the binary
dependent variable equals 1 if the bidder ultimately overbids. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation-
ship between the total time a bidder has led the auction and the probability of overbidding.
The same holds if we restrict the sample to bidders whose ﬁrst bid in the auction is not an
overbid or whose ﬁrst lead bid is not an overbid. Another prediction in the literature on the
quasi-endowment eﬀect is that it is reduced by experience. We have already shown that more
experienced bidders are no less likely to overbid (Finding 4).
In summary, we ﬁnd no direct evidence for quasi-endowment explaining overbidding rela-
tive to the ﬁxed price. The lack of a positive relation between time spent in the auction and
overbidding also rules out other stories based on sunk-cost sensitivity and escalation of com-
mitment (Staw, 1976; Ku, Malhotra, and Murnighan, 2005), which should both be increasing
in time. However, our ﬁndings do not rule out more general versions of utility from winning.
Calibration. In a simple calibration, we provide more insights into the plausibility of lim-
ited attention and utility from winning. Our calibration allows for bidder heterogeneity, with
only a fraction of bidders having non-standard preferences. We vary this fraction from 0 to 1.
We consider a variety of distributions of bidder valuations, including χ2, uniform, exponential,
and logarithmic distributions, and a range of possible moments. We draw eight players from
an inﬁnite population, corresponding to the empirical moment. For each distribution of valu-
ations, we draw 1,000,000 i.i.d. realizations for each player. We then draw another 1 million
values, separately for each of the eight players, from a uniform distribution on [0,1], determin-
ing whether a player is a rational or a behavioral type. For example, when the proportion of
behavioral players is 0.1, only player-auction pairs for which we draw values between 0 and
210.1 are behavioral. We assume that the utility of winning is uniformly distributed between $0
and $10. Values are independently drawn. Hence, we generate a third (1 million x 8)-matrix
of winning utilities drawn from a uniform [0,10] distribution. These values are added to the
values in the ﬁrst matrix if the player is behavioral in the respective auction. We compute the
equilibrium strategies as speciﬁed in Propositions 1 for rational players and in Propositions 3
and 4 for behavioral players,29 setting the simultaneous ﬁxed price equal to $130.
Figure IV shows the calibrations for χ2(130) and U[80,180], i.e., two distributions whose
ﬁrst moment is equal to the ﬁxed price and, in the case of the uniform distribution, reﬂects
the observed minimum and maximum prices.30 The left graphs show the results for Limited
Memory, the right graphs for Utility from Winning. In each graph, we show the percentages of
auctions with a price above the ﬁxed price (Percent overpaid) and of bidders who submit a bid
above the ﬁxed price (Percent overbidders). The leftmost values correspond to our benchmark
rational model and the rightmost values to everybody having non-standard preferences.
In all graphs, the ‘Percent overpaid’ increases steeply starting from a probability around
0.1-0.2 and crosses the 45-degree line. The ‘Percent overbidders’ increases more slowly and
always has a slope below 1, illustrating the disproportionate impact of few overbidders. Both
models match the observed frequency of overbidding (43 percent) and frequency of overbidders
(17 percent) for plausible parameter values. They diﬀer, however, in how well they match
other empirical outcomes. Utility from Winning has the shortcoming that the maximum of
overbidding is limited to the maximum utility from winning, i.e. $10 in our calibration. The
calibration illustrates that a simple utility-of-winning model that imposes an upper limit on
bidders’ willingness to pay for winning fails to produce price distributions similar to those
in Figure II.A, unless we allow for a large maximum amount of utility of winning. Limited
attention emerges as better suited to capture all aspects of the empirical distributions of
outcomes since it do not impose an upper bound on overbids relative to the ﬁxed price p.
IV Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we provide clean evidence on overbidding in the ﬁeld. We exploit the availability
of ﬁxed prices for identical items on the same eBay webpage. A signiﬁcant fraction of bidders
bid more than predicted by a simple rational model, even accounting for uncertainty and
transaction costs. We provide evidence that bidders fail to pay suﬃcient attention to their
outside options, especially when re-bidding. The leading behavioral alternative, utility from
winning, is hard to test in the data, though we can rule out the quasi-endowment eﬀect.
We also provide a calibrational argument that utility from winning cannot easily match the
29It is easy to see that Propositions 1, 3, and 4 hold under bidder heterogeneity, given that bidders’ choices
solely reﬂect whether they beneﬁt from winning with a given bid, relative to the safe outside option.
30Alternative calibrations with the above mentioned distributions are available from the authors.
22empirically observed distribution of bids. The second main ﬁnding is that a small fraction of
bidders who overbid aﬀect a disproportionately large fraction of auction prices and allocations.
Auctions select overbidders as winners and thus amplify the eﬀect of biases in the market.
Our ﬁndings suggest that design elements such as the wording of eBay’s outbid message
(“You have been outbid!”) may have a larger eﬀect on bidding behavior and prices than
traditional auction theory suggests. Proﬁt-maximizing sellers should account for consumers’
behavioral preferences and beliefs when choosing auctions over other price mechanisms and
when selecting a speciﬁc type of auction. This implication is explored by Malmendier and
Szeidl (2009), who compare diﬀerent auction formats and auction designs from the revenue
and welfare perspective after accounting for overbidding biases.31
While our paper analyzes online auctions, overbidding and the disproportionate inﬂuence
of few overbidders apply to auctions more broadly. For example, Ashenfelter and Genesove
(1992) document overbidding in real estate auctions in New Jersey relative to face-to-face
negotiations. A large number of auction participants appears to be key to ensure the presence
of overbidders. Even in mobile-phone auctions, such as the British 3G auctions in 2000-
01, it has been argued that the winners “paid too much” (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002).
Klemperer (2002) attributes the large revenues of the British auction to the low hurdles to
entry32 and argues that the large diﬀerences in revenues across diﬀerent Western European
3G auctions strongly covary with the number of participants. This paper oﬀers an alternative
interpretation: facilitating entry is important to ensure that the auction attracts at least two
overbidders. Another example is mergers and acquisitions. Contested transactions, in which
several bidders aim to acquire the same target, are often suspected to induce overpayment.
Malmendier and Moretti (2006) show that winners of merger ﬁghts perform on average worse
than the losers after the merger ﬁght. While not all ﬁrms overvalue the target, a few overbidders
suﬃce to generate large losses. A last example are initial public oﬀerings, some of which are
actual auctions (e.g. Google) and all of which are later bought and sold in the auction-like
stock market setting. A long-standing view (Stoll and Curley, 1970; Ritter, 1991) is that the
pattern of initial stock-price rise and subsequent decline reﬂects that the initial aftermarket
price is too high. Relatedly, Sherman and Jagannathan (2006) argue that IPO auctions have
been abandoned in the 24 countries that have used them in the past because of overbidding.
While IPO underwriters might favor overbidding, it appears to discourage informed investors
and prevent price discovery. Even in non-auction settings, the same logic may induce sellers
to set exceedingly high prices in the hope of encountering a consumer who, for behavioral or
31In a similar spirit, Kagel and Levin (2009) attribute the popularity of dynamic multi-object auctions, versus
their one-shot counterparts, to bidders’ bounded rationality. Eliaz, Oﬀerman, and Schotter (2008) contrast the
high revenues and the empirical popularity of “right-to-choose” auctions with the predictions of lower revenues
in a rational auction framework.
32Similarly, McAfee and McMillan (1996) explain the variation in the 1994/5 FCC auction prices for broadband
licenses across cities with variation in the number of competitors.
23other reasons, is willing to pay such a price (Ellison, 2005; Ellison and Ellison, 2009).
Our ﬁndings have more general implications about consumer choices. They suggest that
consumers might not always choose the lowest-price good, even when the goods are homoge-
neous and search costs are low. Understanding the extent of this phenomenon could help us
understand the large and persistent price dispersion documented, for example, by Pratt, Wise,
and Zeckhauser (1979) when searching by phone, or by Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2004) and
(2006), including online searches. In the long run, a better understanding of this phenomenon
might help us make our models of competition more accurate.
24Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1.(a) In the second stage, it is optimal for player i not to purchase
i fs h eh a sw o nt h ea u c t i o ni nt h eﬁrst stage since the payoﬀ after purchasing, vi − pw − p,i s
strictly smaller than the payoﬀ after not purchasing, vi −pw. If she has lost the auction in the
ﬁrst stage, it is optimal to purchase in the second stage if and only if vi ≥ p since the payoﬀ
from purchasing, vi − p, is weakly higher than the payoﬀ from not purchasing, 0, if and only
if vi ≥ p.
Taking into account the second-stage behavior, we now show that bidding b∗
i =m i n {vi,p}
in the ﬁrst-stage game is part of a PBE. We distinguish two possible deviations bi 6= b∗
i.
Case 1: bi < min{vi,p}. There are three subcases. Either both bi and b∗
i are the highest
bid, or neither is, or b∗
i is the highest bid and bi is not. In the ﬁrst subcase, player i obtains
the object at the same auction price and, hence, makes the same second-stage decision after
both bids. In the second subcase, i does not win the auction and, again, makes the same
second-stage decision after both bids. In the last subcase, bi induces payoﬀ max{vi − p,0},
while b∗
i induces vi − pw,w h e r epw ≤ b∗
i =m i n {vi,p}.T h u s ,i’s payoﬀ from bidding bi is the
same as after b∗
i in the ﬁrst two subcases and is weakly lower in the third subcase. Hence, bi
induces weakly lower expected utility than b∗
i.
Case 2: bi > min{vi,p}. By the same reasoning as before, i attains the same utility with
bi and b∗ if either both are the highest bid or neither is. If, instead, b∗
i is not the highest bid
but bi is, then bi induces payoﬀ vi −pw with pw ≥ min{vi,p},w h i l eb∗
i induces max{vi −p,0}.
Thus, again, bi leads to weakly lower expected utility than b∗
i.
Hence, i has no incentive to deviate from b∗
i, and bidding b∗
i in the ﬁrst stage along with
the second-stage strategies detailed above is a PBE.
(b) (By contradiction.) Assume that there is a PBE and a realization of valuations b v =
(b v1,b v2,...,b vN) such that pw(b v) > p. Denote the bidder who wins the auction in this case, i.
e., under realization b v in this equilibrium, as w, her strategy as sw(vw), and the strategies of
all N players by s. We show that, under an alternative strategy s0
w(vw), w’s payoﬀ is weakly
higher for all realizations of valuations and strictly higher for some realizations. (We denote
the strategies of all players, with only w’s strategy changed from sw to s0
w,a ss0.) For all
realizations v where vw 6= b vw,w ed e ﬁne s0
w to be identical to sw.F o rvw = b vw,w ep r e s c r i b e
bidding min{b vw,p} and not purchasing in the second stage unless the auction is lost and b vw ≥ p.
The resulting payoﬀsa r e :
(i) For all v 6= b v with vw 6= b vw, w’s payoﬀ is the same under s0
w and sw.
(ii) For v = b v, strategy sw earns b vw − pw(b v)o rb vw − pw(b v) − p, depending on the second-
stage strategy. With strategy s0
w, instead, w loses the auction (since pw(b v) > p)a n de a r n s
max{b vw − p,0}, i. e., strictly more than under sw.
(iii) For all remaining realizations v 6= b v with vw = b vw, we distinguish three subcases. If
25both the bid prescribed by sw, bw(b vw), and the bid prescribed by s0
w, b0
w(b vw)=m i n {b v,p},w i n
the auction or if both lose the auction, w obtains the same payoﬀ under s0
w and sw (or a higher
payoﬀ under s0
w if sw prescribes to purchase in the second stage after winning, to purchase after
losing even though b vw < p, or not to purchase after losing even though b vw > p ). If, instead, bw
wins the auction and b0
w loses the auction, then the payoﬀ under s0
w,m a x {b vw −p,0},i sw e a k l y
higher than the payoﬀ under sw,w h e r ew wins the auction and pays at least min{b vw,p}.
Thus, s0
w induces a weakly higher payoﬀ than sw ∀v and a strictly higher payoﬀ for some
realizations of v. Given full support of the continuous distribution of v, w’s expected utility is
higher under s0
w than under sw,a n dw has an incentive to deviate from sw.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 ’ . ( a )In the proof of Proposition 1(a), substitute b∗
i =m i n {vi,p}
with b∗
i = υi −αmax{υi − p,0}. The optimal second-stage strategy is unaltered if the item is
available. (If the item is not available the player does not choose an action.) To show that b∗
i =
υi − αmax{υi − p,0} is part of a PBE in the subgame after entering the auction, distinguish
the two possible devitiations bi <υ i−αmax{υi − p,0} ( C a s e1 )a n dbi >υ i−αmax{υi − p,0}
(Case 2), and the proof of Proposition 1(a) applies.
(b) We show that, in any PBE,
Z
v
pw(b1(v1),...,b N(vN))dF(v) < p
with b(v)=( b1(v1),...,b N(vN)) denoting the bidding strategies and F the cdf of v.A sb e f o r e ,
the decision of a player i not to enter is denoted by bi =0 . W ea l s od e n o t et h em a r g i n a lc d f
of the ith component as Fi, the conditional cdf of all other components, given vi,a sF−i|i,a n d
the corresponding pdf’s by f, fi,a n df−i|i.T h eﬁxed price sale is available before the auction
and remains after the auction with probability α ∈ [0,1).
In any PBE, player i enters the auction iﬀ the expected utility from bidding in the auction
is higher than max{vi−p,0}, i.e., the utility of either never purchasing nor bidding (a positive
amount) or purchasing in the ﬁrst stage. Thus, all players i with vi ≤ p enter and bid a positive
amount bi(vi) > 0i ﬀ








And all players i with vi > p enter iﬀ

















{v|i wins ∧ vi≤p}
pw(b(v))dF(v)+
Z










{v|i loses ∧ vi>p}
vidF(v)+α
Z




{v|i wins ∧ vi≤p}
vidF(v)+
Z
{v|i wins ∧ vi>p}
pdF(v)+( 1− α)
Z
{v|i loses ∧ vi>p}
pdF(v) − (1 − α)
Z




{v|i wins ∧ vi≤p}
vidF(v)+
Z
{v|i wins ∧ vi>p}
pdF(v)+( 1− α)
Z
{v|i loses ∧ vi>p}
(p − vi)dF(v)
Since the last term is strictly negative, given continuous support of v on RN
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 .We show that, in any PBE,
Z
v
pw(b1(v1),...,b N(vN))dF(v) < p
with b(v)=( b1(v1),...,b N(vN)) denoting the bidding strategies and F the cdf of v.A sb e f o r e ,
the decision of a player i not to enter is denoted by bi =0 . W ea l s od e n o t et h em a r g i n a lc d f
of the ith component as Fi, the conditional cdf of all other components, given vi,a sF−i|i,a n d
the corresponding pdf’s by f, fi,a n df−i|i. W ed e n o t ew i t hc t h ec o s to fs w i t c h i n g ,i . e . ,o f
purchasing at the ﬁxed price after having bid in the auction.
27In any PBE, player i enters the auction iﬀ the expected utility from bidding in the auction
is higher than max{vi−p,0}, i.e., the utility of either never purchasing nor bidding (a positive
amount) or purchasing in the ﬁrst stage. Thus, all players i with low valuations vi ≤ p enter
and bid bi(vi) > 0i ﬀ








Players i with medium valuations p + c ≥ vi > p enter iﬀ








And players i with high valuations vi > p + c enter iﬀ
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P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 ’ . Following the proof of Proposition 2, the uncertain availability
of the ﬁxed price after the auction aﬀects only the auction participation condition for players
with high valuations vi > p + c.T h e ye n t e ri ﬀ










(vi − p − c)dF−i|i(v−i)
The other two participation constraints (for players with low valuations vi ≤ p and for players
with medium valuations p+c ≥ vi > p) are unaﬀected. Taking expectations of pw with respect
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Search Criteria for Cross-sectional Auction Data
The primary selection criterion was that a given set of search words retrieves homogeneous
items of exactly the same quality. We took several steps to avoid mismatches. First, we iden-
tiﬁed products with unique identiﬁers, such as model numbers or brand names (electronics,
perfumes). Secondly, we focused on products that are highly likely to be new (hygiene prod-
ucts), or boxed products that could be easily identiﬁed as new (electronics). We also found
that eBay users have conventions for denoting product quality (new, almost new, used, etc.).
We required that the applicable naming convention for new products be present in the every
item description. For example, items in boxes needed to be described with “new in box,”
“nib,” “sealed,” “unopened,” or “never opened.” We also employed several advanced eBay
search features:
1. Search title and description. We searched not only the item title (default), but also the
item description. Product quality is often denoted in the description.
2. Browsing hierarchy. eBay assigns products to detailed categories. Narrowly chosen cate-
gories allowed us to eliminate diﬀering products.
303. Minimum and maximum price. For each item in our cross-sectional data, we carefully
determined a price below which a brand new item could not possibly be listed, and a price
above which it could never sold. Minimum prices eliminated accessories and blatantly used
products in the BIN results. Maximum prices eliminated bundled items in both the auctions
and BIN results. We conducted test downloads where we simply searched for the item names,
then hand-checked for false positives (e.g. an iPod case instead of an iPod). This allowed us
to derive boundaries for the item prices.
4. NOT. This eBay search feature allows specifying words that cannot be in the product
description. We used this feature to eliminate related but diﬀerent products.
5. OR. This eBay search feature allows specifying a group of words, at least one of which must
be in the product description. We used this feature mainly to account for the multiple ways to
refer to a new product. We also used it in cases of multiple descriptions of an identical feature
such as “4gb” or “4 gb,” “3.4oz” or “100ml.”
BIN Extraction for Cross-sectional Auction Data
Buy-it-now downloads were usually scheduled to take place within 30 minutes of the re-
spective auction close. For some auctions ending in the middle of the night the BINs were
downloaded within a few hours of the auction close, most often within two hours. (The like-
lihood of the cheapest BIN changing within the space of two hours at that time of day was
very low.) The purpose of extracting the BIN prices right before the close of the auction is to
ﬁnd the cheapest ﬁxed-price match to each auction item. Overall, 91.86 percent of ﬁxed prices
were within 120 minutes of the auction ending time in Download 1, 94.56 percent in Download
2, and 94.28 percent in Download 3.
After removing a few mismatched items, we identiﬁed the cheapest ﬁxed price for each
item type without accounting for shipping costs and the cheapest ﬁxed price accounting for
shipping costs. We obtained a ﬁnal data set of 5,708 ﬁxed-price listings, 1,876 for the auctions
of Download 1, 1,726 for Download 2, and 2,106 for Download 3.
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37Variable     Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Starting Price 167 46.56 43.96 0.01 150
Final Price 167 131.95 16.84 81.00 179.30
Shipping Cost 140 12.51 3.81 4.95 20.00
Total Price 140 144.27 14.96 110.99 185.50
Number of Bids 167 16.84 9.21 1 39
Number of Bidders 138 8.41 3.84 1 18
Feedback Score Buyer 138 37.86 104.37 -1 929
Feedback Score Seller 138 296.17 1,567.47 0 14,730
Positive Feedback Percentage Seller 138 59.81 48.88 0 100
Auction Length [in days] 167 6.27 1.69 1 10
     one day 167 1.20%
     three days 167 11.38%
     five days 167 17.37%
     seven days 167 65.27%
     ten days 167 4.79%
Auction Ending Weekday
     Monday 167 11.98%
     Tuesday 167 7.78%
     Wednesday 167 15.57%
     Thursday 167 11.98%
     Friday 167 9.58%
     Saturday 167 18.56%
     Sunday 167 24.55%
Auction Starting Hour 167 14.84 5.21 0 23
Auction Ending Hour 167 14.84 5.21 0 23
Prime Time 167 33.53%
Title New 167 16.77%
Title Bonus Tapes/Video 167 27.54%
Explicit195        167 31.14%
Table I. Summary Statistics: Cash-Flow 101 Data
Panel A. Auction-Level Data
The sample period is 02/11/2004 to 09/06/2004. Final Price is the price paid by the winner excluding
shipping costs; it is equal to the second-highest bid plus the bid increment. Shipping Cost is the flat-rate
shipping cost set by the seller. Total Price is the sum of Final Price and Shipping Cost. Auction Starting
and Ending Hours are defined as 0 for the time interval from 12 am to 1 am, 1 for the time interval from 1
am to 2 am etc. Prime Time is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the auction ends between 3 pm and 7
pm PDT. Delivery Insurance is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if any delivery insurance is available.
Title New is a dummyand equal to 1 if the title indicates that the item is new. Title Bonus Tapes/Video is
a dummy and equal to 1 if the title indicates that the bonus tapes or videos are included. Explicit195 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the item description mentions the $195 manufacturer price.  Variable     Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of auctions per bidder 807 1.44 1.25 1 17
Number of bids per bidder (total) 807 2.92 3.35 1 33
Number of bids per bidder (per auction) 807 2.03 1.76 1 22
Average bid per bidder [in $] 807 87.96 38.34 0.01 175.00
Maximum bid per bidder [in $] 807 95.14 39.33 0.01 177.50
Winning frequency per bidder (total) 807 0.17 0.38 0 2
Winning frequency per bidder (per auction) 807 0.14 0.34 0 1
 Variable     Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Bid value [in $] 2,353 87.94 36.61 0.01 177.5
Bid price outstanding [in $] 2,353 83.99 38.07 0.01 177.5
Leading bid [in $] 2,353 93.76 35.18 0.01 177.5
Feedback Score Buyer 2,353 32.40 104.65 -1 1,378
Feedback Score Seller 2,353 273.23 1422.55 0 14,730
Positive Feedback Percentage Seller 2,353 64.72 47.40 0 100
Starting time of auction 2,353 15.63 4.91 0.28 23.06
Ending time of auction 2,353 15.68 4.93 0.28 23.41
Bidding time 2,353 13.70 5.54 0.20 24.00
Last-minute bids
    during the last 60 minutes 2,353 6.25%
    during the last 10 minutes 2,353 4.25%
    during the last 5 minutes 2,353 3.48%
Bid on auction with Explicit195 2,353 0.32 0.47 0 1
Bid on auction with delivery insurance  2,353 0.46 0.50 0 1
Bids on auction with bonus tapes/videos 2,353 0.25 0.43 0 1
Table I. Summary Statistics: Cash Flow 101 Data (continued)
Panel B. Bidder-Level Data
Bids are submitted bids, except in the case of the winning bid which is displayed as the winning
price (the second-highest bid plus the appropriate increment).
Panel C. Bid-Level Data# Items # Auctions # Items # Auctions # Items # Auctions
Consumer electronics 16 197 28 129 26 140
Computer hardware 8 62 11 83 10 55
Financial software 7 125 3 15 3 12
Sports equipment 3 16 6 24 3 17
Personal care products 2 23 16 100 13 160
Perfume / cologne 3 18 4 23 4 36
Toys / games 4 99 5 24 5 42
Books 6 175 6 106 6 117
Cosmetics 0 0 2 16 2 5
Home products 0 0 2 8 2 21
Automotive products 0 0 1 3 1 6
DVDs 0 0 5 36 5 38
Total 49 715 89 567 80 649
The sample consists of all downloaded auctions in US currency for the items listed in Appendix-Table
A.1 unless the auction was removed by eBay during the listing period, received no bids, ended before
corresponding fixed-price data could be collected, or could otherwise not be downloaded.
Table II. Summary Statistics: Cross-sectional Data
Item Category
Download 1 Download 2 Download 3 Variable     Obs. Mean  Std. Dev. Min. Max.
   Overpayment (Final Price) 166 0.28 16.70 -48.95 47.55
   Overpayment (Total Price) 139 2.69 14.94 -28.91 45.60
Obs.


















Table III. Overbidding: Cashflow 101 Data
Overpayment (Final Price) is equal to Final Price minus thes imultaneous buy-it-now price set by
the professional retailers. Overpayment (Total Price) is equal to Total Price minus the sum of the
simultaneous buy-it-now price and the cheapest shipping cost for the buy-it-now item charged by
the professional retailers. The exact auction date is missing for one auction, reducing the sample
to 166 (from 167 in Table I).
c
Fraction of Total 
Number of Auctions



















Consumer electronics 173 36% 145 41% 124 44% 108 39% 138 38% 111 31%
Computer hardware 62 29% 54 35% 73 32% 66 24% 55 35% 41 24%
Financial software 125 62% 94 49% 15 53% 13 38% 12 42% 12 25%
Sports equipment 13 8% 13 15% 25 68% 24 25% 17 76% 15 40%
Personal care 23 39% 14 50% 99 43% 74 38% 160 29% 127 39%
Perfume / cologne 18 67% 10 40% 23 30% 17 24% 36 31% 31 23%
Toys / games 99 48% 85 56% 23 43% 15 47% 42 36% 32 9%
Books 175 75% 156 69% 106 68% 93 55% 117 72% 96 60%
Cosmetics 16 44% 16 31% 5 60% 5 40%
Home products 8 13% 7 14% 21 29% 19 11%
Automotive products 3 0% 1 0% 6 0% 4 0%
DVDs 36 61% 32 50% 38 74% 33 64%
Total 688 52% 571 51% 551 48% 466 39% 647 44% 526 37%
Download 2 Download 3
The sample consists of all auctions matched to buy-it-now prices for the same item, available at the end of the auction period.












Is the bid an over-bid? No 2,101 89.29%
Yes 252 10.71%
Total 2,353 100.00%
Overbidding is defined relative to the buy-it-now price (without shipping costs).
Table V. Disproportionate Influence of OverbiddersFull First Bids Later Bids Full First Bids Later Bids
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Distance to nearest BIN listing 1.176 1.106 1.021 1.061 0.995 1.025 1.056 1.006
[rows between] [0.025]*** [0.029]*** [0.028] [0.042] [0.037] [0.028] [0.043] [0.038]
(Price just below)*(Distance to BIN) 0.894 0.868 0.939 0.822 0.933 0.752
[0.160] [0.245] [0.204] [0.128] [0.232] [0.147]
(Price just above)*(Distance to BIN) 2.083 2.948 1.785 1.372 1.538 1.469
[0.487]*** [0.911]*** [0.670] [0.239]* [0.324]** [0.421]
(Price far above)*(Distance to BIN) 1.159 0.640 1.325 1.231 0.861 1.261
[0.137] [0.236] [0.152]** [0.118]** [0.346] [0.133]**
Price outstanding just below BIN price 1.164 1.326 1.164 1.205 0.835 1.799
[dummy] [0.207] [0.357] [0.279] [0.179] [0.198] [0.347]***
Price outstanding just above BIN price 1.747 0.966 2.920 1.861 1.027 3.255
[dummy] [0.453]** [0.381] [1.004]*** [0.412]*** [0.345] [0.992]***
Price outstanding far above BIN price 2.152 1.761 2.844 2.746 1.213 5.922
[dummy] [0.449]*** [0.617] [0.781]*** [0.729]*** [0.575] [2.057]***
Position on screen 0.988 0.918 0.974 1.000 0.983 0.973 0.998 0.945
[row number] [0.005]** [0.009]*** [0.013]** [0.019] [0.004]*** [0.013]** [0.019] [0.018]***
Price outstanding 0.975 0.99 0.983 1.006 0.991 0.981 1.013
[0.003]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.005] [0.003]*** [0.005]*** [0.005]**
(Price outstanding)
2 1.002 0.989 0.988 0.983 0.988 0.991 0.977
[0.002] [0.003]*** [0.004]*** [0.004]*** [0.003]*** [0.004]** [0.004]***
Starting price 0.994 0.994 0.998 0.99 0.994 0.998 0.991
[0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]* [0.001]***
Auction controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extended time controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 14,043 14,043 14,043 6,712 7,331 14,043 6,712 7,331
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.14 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.18 0.25 0.16
Full Sample
Table VI. Bidding and Limited Attention
McFadden conditional logit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 for items that are bid on at a particular time, and 0 for items
that are available but are not chosen by the bidder at that time. The sample consists of all auctions listed at each actual bidding instance.
Reported are the exponentiated coefficients (odds ratios). Standard errrors are clustered by bidding instance. Auction controls include
Seller reputation [measured by feedback score], Auction length [in days], a dummy for Prime time (6-9pm Pacific Time), and Remaining
auction time [measured in days and fraction of days]. Extended time controls include Remaining auction time squared and cubed,
dummies for Last day, six dummies for the six last hours of the auction.
Dependent variable: binary variable equal to 1 for items bid on (at a given time)
"Just above/below" = +/-$5 "Just above/below" = +/-$10Figure I. Listing ExamplePanel A. Bin-width $5
Panel B. Bin-width $1
Figure II. Distribution of Final Prices
The six graphs display histograms and kernel densities of the Final Prices. The histograms in Panel A are in bins of $5 width. The histograms in Panel B
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Subsample with fixed price at $139.95Panel B. Overbidding By Experience
The sample consists of all Cashflow 101 auctions. The Below Median sample contains all winners with a
Feedback Score of 4 or lower; the Above Median sample contains all winners with a Feedback Score above
4. Subsamples sizes are in the second pair of parentheses.
Figure III. Overbidding
Panel A. Overbidding By Item Category
The leftmost column shows the percent of auction prices above the BIN in the Cashflow 101 data. The other
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Figure IV. Calibrations
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Percent overpaid Percent overbidders
43% Line 17% Line(1) (2) (3)
Total lead time 0.123 0.161 0.139
(0.220) (0.207) (0.201)
Value of last lead bid 0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Time of the last outbid 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Price outstanding at the time of the last outbid 0.000 0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
N 784 742 732
Pseudo R-squared 0.2232 0.1889 0.1902
Appendix - Table A.1 Overbidding and Quasi-endowment
Probit model where the binary dependent variable is 1 if the bidder ultimately overbids. In Column 1,
we consider the sample of all bidders who have been lead bidder at some point and who have been
outbid at some point. Column 2 restricts the sample of Column 1 to those bidders whose first bid was
not an overbid. Column 3 restricts the sample of Column 1 to those bidders whose first bid that made
the lead bidder was not an overbid. Total lead time is the total length of the times a bidder was lead
bidder. We also control for the value of the bidder's last lead bid and the time and price outstanding
when she is ultimately outbid. Coefficients are reported as marginal effects.Online-Appendix
A. Cross-Sectional Data: Construction of the Data Set
The full list of all items contained the cross-sectional data set (data set 2) as
well as the complete search strings are shown in Online-Appendix Table 1.
Online-Appendix Table 2 presents a matrix that summarizes the data con-
struction and composition, starting from the initial number of dowloaded auc-
tions to the ﬁnal list used in the empirical analysis.
B. Cross-Sectional Data: Results on Demographics
With our cross-sectional data, we also explore diﬀerences in overbidding by
demographics. While we do not observe bidder demographics directly, our data
includes objects associated with a consumer demographic. To examine gender
diﬀerences, we compare for example perfumes of the same brand for men and
women. As shown in Online-Appendix 3, the frequency of overbidding is higher
for products that target men than for those targeting women, though the diﬀer-
ence is not large (38 percent versus 33 percent) and, in aggregate, not signiﬁcant
(s.e.=5 .03 percent). We also examine diﬀerences by target age groups, com-
paring toys for kids (Elmo), teenagers (games and playstations), and adults
(electronics). We ﬁnd no systematic diﬀerences. Comparing books of liberal
versus conservative authors (Obama versus O’Reilly), we ﬁnd again no system-
atic pattern. Finally, to capture the impact of income, we compare the prices
for cheap versus expensive products, such as ﬁnancial software (Quicken 2007
Basic versus Home Business). Again, overbidding is signiﬁcant in each category
and not systematically correlated with th ep r i c el e v e l .O v e r a l l ,w ed on o td e t e c t
any signiﬁcant correlation with features of the target consumer. Overbidding is
sizeable within each demographic subset.
As discussed above, the larger-scale cross-sectional data comes at the cost of
some loss of control over the setting. In particular, diﬀerently from the Cashﬂow
101 data, we cannot be sure about the availability of the same buy-it-now prices
in the future or about diﬀerences in seller reputation between the auction and
the ﬁxed price listings.
C. Cross-Sectional Data: Results on Price Level
Our cross-sectional data allows us to test whether overbidding frequencies are
lower for more expensive items. The scatterplots in Online-Appendix Figure I
show the share of bidders that overbid for each price level, as determined by
the corresponding ﬁxed price. Panel A uses the full data across all items in the
cross-sectional data. Panel B shows overbidding by price level separately for
diﬀerent item categories. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant relation between price level and
overbidding.
1D. Choice experiment
We conducted a choice experiment with 99 students at the Stanford Behavioral
Laboratory on April 17, 2006. Subjects had to choose among three items from
our Cashﬂow 101 data based on their description, namely, two randomly drawn
auction descriptions and one of the two professional buy-it-now descriptions.
Seller identiﬁcation and prices were removed from the description, as was the
indication of auction versus ﬁxed price. Subjects were asked which of three
items they would prefer to purchase, assuming that prices and listing details
such as remaining time and number of bids were identical. The choice was
hypothetical, and there was no payment conditional on the subjects’ choice. The
same three listings were shown to all subjects but the order of the descriptions
was randomized, following the scheme shown in Online-Appendix Table 4. We
used three diﬀerent ways to number the items, depending on the order: as A, B,
C, as 1, 2, 3, or as i, ii, iii. One example and detailed instructions are included
below.
As discussed in Section 4.1 of the main paper, three subjects did not provide
answers. Among the remaining subjects, 35 percent expressed indiﬀerence, 50
percent chose the oﬀer of the professional retailer, and 15 percent preferred
one of the two auction items. When asked to explain their choice, the 14 stu-
dents who chose an auction item most commonly said that the ﬁxed price oﬀer
provided too much information — a reaction that may have been driven by time
pressure in the six-minute experiment. Students who chose the retailer’s oﬀer
most commonly mentioned the retailer’s money-back-guarantee and more pro-
fessional layout. Hence, it is unlikely that unobserved quality diﬀerence explain
the bidding behavior.
2Download 1 Download 2 Download 3
Nokia N93 cell phone 7 2 2
Motorola V3 Razr cell phone (gold)  14 7 9
Motorola KRZR K1 cell phone (black) 4 0 2
Motorola KRZR K1 cell phone (blue) 3 0 0
Garmin StreetPilot c330 Vehicle GPS Navigator 12
Garmin StreetPilot c550 Vehicle GPS Navigator 2
1GB Apple iPod Shuffle (pink) 3 8 0
1GB Apple iPod Shuffle (blue) 11 4 4
1GB Apple iPod Shuffle (orange) 7 3 4
1GB Apple iPod Shuffle (green) 5 1 1
4GB Apple iPod Nano (blue) 30 2 3
4GB Apple iPod Nano (green) 17 0 2
4GB Apple iPod Nano (pink) 24 3 5
4GB Apple iPod Nano (silver) 31 3 5
80GB Apple iPod (black) 21 5 1
80GB Apple iPod (white) 6 1 0
30GB Microsoft Zune (black) 17 24
30GB Microsoft Zune (white) 11 4
XM2Go AC power cord for MyFi, Helix, Inno, Nexus 1
Texas Instruments TI-89 Titanium graphing calculator 16 15
Texas Instruments TI-83 Plus graphing calculator 11 14
InFocus Play Big 480p IN72 DLP projector 3 0
Bose Lifestyle 48 speaker system (black) 0 4
Garmin StreetPilot c320 Vehicle GPS Navigator 7 9
Kenwood KDC-MP2032 automotive CD player 0
Canon PowerShot SD600 6 megapixel digital camera 0 2
Canon PowerShot SD630 6 megapixel digital camera 1 3
Canon PowerShot SD900 10 megapixel digital camera 8 2
Canon PowerShot A630 8 megapixel digital camera 4 8
T-Mobile Sidekick 3 cell phone 11 17
Western Digital My Book 500GB external hard drive 21 10 10
Western Digital My Book 400GB external hard drive 1
Western Digital My Book 320GB external hard drive 2
Sandisk 4GB Secure Digital Ultra USB flash drive 15
D-Link DI-524 wireless router 9 0 3
Linksys WRT300N wireless router 7 6 10
Omni Verifone 3750 credit card terminal 4
Nurit 2085 credit card terminal 3
Sandisk 1GB Cruzer Micro U3 USB flash drive   29
Belkin F5D7230 wireless router 8 5
HP Laser Jet 3050 All in One printer/copy/scanner/fax 17 7
Lexmark P450 photo printer 0 1
Linksys WUSB11 wireless USB network adaptor 3 3
Linksys WRE54G wireless router 5 7
Netgear WGR614 wireless router 5 5
Netgear WGR624 wireless router 0 4
QuickBooks Premier Accountant Edition 2007 1
QuickBooks Premier Accountant Edition 2007 (5-User) 0
Quicken Basic 2007 38 8 5
Quicken Deluxe 2007 12
Quicken Home Business 2007 28 5 6
H&R Block Taxcut 2006 Premium Federal and State 44










hardwareCallaway HX Tour golf balls (6 dozen)  11 0
Titleist Pro V1 golf balls (4 dozen) 3
Titleist Pro V1 golf balls (2 dozen) 2
Omron HJ-112 Premium digital pedometer 18 11
Super Gym 3000 Total Fitness Model exercise machine  2 5
Oakley Wisdom ski goggles (khaki, gold, iridium) 0
Oakley Wisdom ski goggles 0
Bones Reds skateboard bearings 4 1
Braun 8995 electric shaver 4 2 19
Braun 8985 electric shaver 19 8 13
T3 Tourmaline hair dryer 0
Farouk Chi Turbo Big 2” ceramic flat iron hair straightener 0
Murad Acne Complex kit 6 8
Farouk Chi 1” ceramic flat iron hair straightener 12 22
Farouk Chi 1” ceramic flat iron hair straightener (red) 1
T3 Tourmaline ceramic flat iron hair straightener 1 4
Oral-B Vitality Sonic rechargeable toothbrush 8 8
Oral-B Sonic S-320 power toothbrush 1 14
Oral-B Professional Care 7850 DLX power toothbrush  9 8
Oral-B Professional Care 9400 Triumph power toothbrush 25 31
Sonicare 7300 power toothbrush 0 17
Bumble & Bumble Hair Tonic (8oz) 5 11
Norelco 8140 Speed XL shaver 5 4
Proactive Renewing Cleanser  17 1
Lovely by Sarah Jessica Parker perfume (3.4oz) 3 9 6
Calvin Klein Eternity Cologne for Men (3.4oz) 6 9 5
Calvin Klein Eternity Perfume for Women (3.4oz) 9 3 18
Escada Island Kiss perfume 2 7
PlayStation3 Sixaxis wireless controller 12 4 10
Nintendo Wii Play: 9 games, wireless remote, & nunchuck 3
Xbox 360 wireless controller 23 6 14
Tickle Me Elmo TMX 61 10 14
Parker Brothers Monopoly Here & Now  3 2
Nintendo DS Super Mario Brothers game  1 2
You on a Diet , by Craig Wynett and Lisa Mehmet 41 28 31
The Audacity of Hope , by Barack Obama 11 4 5
Culture Warrior, by Bill O'Reilly 14 6 1
For One More Day , by Mitch Albom 6 1 1
The Secret, by Rhonda Byrne 70 51 60
The Best Life Diet, by Bob Greene 33 16 19
Lancome Fatale mascara (black, full size) 6 2
Lancome Definicils mascara (black, full size) 10 3
Roomba Scheduler 4230 robotic vacuum cleaner 5 16
Yankee Housewarmer Christmas-cookie-scented candle (22oz) 3 5
Automotive 
products Inline auto ignition spark plug tester  3 6
Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles The Movie  DVD 0 0
Scrubs Complete Fourth Season on DVD 10 12
Lost First Season on DVD  10 10
Grey's Anatomy Second Season on DVD 6 5
Lost Second Season on DVD 10 11




















Initially downloaded auctions  1,136 1,643 1,084 3,863
Auctions not retrieved at auction ending time 
(removed by eBay; outages in internet connection) 107 582 18 707
Ended before BINs downloaded 0 107 0 107
Auctions with no bids 307 378 372 1,057
Auctions in non-US currency 1 0 22 23
Auctions for items not on list 61 4 2 3 4 3
Final list of auctions (pre-matching) 715 562 649 1,926












The sample consists of all auctions matched to buy-it-now prices for the same item, available at the end of the auction period.
Male products are electric shavers (Braun 8995/8985, Norelco 8140xl), hair tonics (Bumble & Bumble), colognes (Calvin Klein
Eternity), and dark iPods (blue, green, silver); female products are hair straighteners (Fourk Chi, T3 Tourmaline), cosmetics
(Lancôme Fatale/Definicils mascara), perfumes (Calvin Klein Eternity, Lovely Jessica Parker, Escada Island Kiss), and bright
iPods (pink). Products for kids are toys (Tickle Me Elmo), for teenagers games and playstations (Super Mario Brothers, Sixaxis
Wireless PS3 Controller, Wireless Xbox 360 Controller), and for adults all consumer electronics. The book “Audacity of Hope”
by Obama is liberal, the book “Cultural Warriors” by O’Reilly conservative. Price level comparisons are made with financial
software (Quicken 2007 Basic vs Home Business), navigation systems (Garmin C320, C330, and C550), iPods (shuffle, nano,
and 80gb), and digital cameras (Canon A630, SD600, and SD630).
Online-Appendix Table 3. Overbidding by Demographics
in Cross-Sectional Data
Target Consumer
Without Shipping With Shipping









Most expensive 40% 56%
Expensive 38% 48%
More expensive 41% 35%Ordering 1 Ordering 2 Ordering 3 Aggregate
First item description 14 2 3
(retailer) (individual 1) (individual 2)
Second item description 1 5 19
(individual 1) (individual 2) (retailer)
Third item description 1 15 2
(individual 2) (retailer) (individual 1)
Indifferent 14 11 9 34
Did not answer 0 1 2 3
Total 30 34 35 99
Total (answered) 30 33 33 96
Percent Indifferent 47% 33% 27% 35%
Percent Preferring Retailer Item 47% 45% 58% 50%
Percent Preferring Auction Item 7% 21% 15% 15%
The order in which subjects received the item descriptions varies by Ordering and is indicated in
italics below the number of subjects choosing that description.
Online-Appendix Table 4. Choice ExperimentPanel A.  Overbidding across All Items
Panel B.  Overbidding by Item Category
Online-Appendix Figure I:  Overbidding by Price Level
The following graphs show the share of bidders that overbid for each price level. Price levels are determined by the matching
fixed price for each item. Panel A shows overbidding by price level across all items that have a matching fixed price in the
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Perfumes and Colognes(N=77)